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I’m in therapy three times a week .Two groups and a one on one. In my Monday group, one guy said that a buddy of his is still bitter about the war protesters ;and he thought that was foolish. Another guy talked about how difficult the guys who fled to Canada had it. Well, talk about reaching a boiling point ! ! I went off on both of them. The same two guys are also in my Wednesday group. They both had thought it over , and decided that I was correct. It’s just unfortunate that because we were used as cannon fodder , PTSD has become so much a part of our lives.
I post and it got hot in here again. And thanks Terry for your thanks, but all I did was document events and dates for you. How they affected you was your part. At one time I was in Gary’s camp about PTSD. I have seen the evaluation criteria the VA uses and my brother fits the worst at 100%, but he was never in the military. Yes, we are all affected by previous events in our lives and we all react differently.
At least once a week you can hear me say how lucky I feel to have served in VN. It has made me what I am today and I am not ashamed. It created the best circle of friends I would never would have had otherwise. A great bunch of guys here, America’s best.
Thanks Terry.
Bill, not to belabor the point, my counselor felt that anybody with a CIB deserved more consideration. He insisted I appeal and after 6 yrs of appeals and letters and testimonies of many, including Ben , they finally figured out I wasn’t going away. When my wife got fed up, putting it mildly. and called our U.S. Senator’s office, they suddenly made a quick decision and now the VA and SS are my friends. Funny how that works. Moral of the story, you didn’t give up in Nam, appeal if not for yourself than for your family. They have PTSD too.
Mine started with “Desert Storm” & really kicked in with the “War on Terror” I could see Vietnam all over again. The dreams started, anger, depression, etc. My pastor suggested going to the VA. I did & wound up at a Vet Center. They decided I was 10% crazy. Like the rest of you I am dealing with it.
I used to think PTSD was bullshit, that it was a cheap, un-contestable, phony way to get a check from the government. I believed the guys who were “disabled” by it were con artists, riding the war as an excuse for doing whatever they liked and being paid for doing it.
Then, on a bright, sunny, no-stress day about 20 years ago….I snapped and tried to kill a guy who really didn’t need killing. And, I really tried. But, I wasn’t even aware I was doing it until after it was all over. It was like one of those out of body experiences where I could see what was going on, but made no connection between the event and myself. It registered nothing on the emotional scale at all. I could have..should have..ended up in prison, but God Himself protected me and that other guy as nobody got hurt, no damage was done and nobody went to jail. There’s no other explanation.
After about a year of fearing it would happen again, and not knowing how to prevent it because I didn’t know what caused or triggered it, I finally went to the VA. They pretty quickly determined it was a result of combat trauma, so did Social Security, and today they pay me not to work and deal with the stress that entails.
I can’t argue with them. If it wasn’t Vietnam, what was it?
Like Ben I have read all the comments about personal stories and PTSD. I never knew there could be an emotional problem attachment involving VN. But today I know there is a reason for waking in the middle of the night, driving to the mountains to hear the sound of water rushing by in the rivers. Why for years I always had to have my back to the door in restaurants, or sit in the back seats at movie theatres. Yes hyper vigilence was necessary and poor sleep due to unusual noise whether real or perceived is still with me. Some who I consider my best friends, both personal and my brothers here say “get over it” or ” it don’t mean nothing”.That can be near impossible because my thoughts now say denial is not an option. Eight years ago I lost it one day driving to work, a beautiful sunny day, I wanted to head for the hills and isolate, not do my job and I owned the business! A friend convinced me to seek the VAand they evaluated me and sent me to a counselor who had walked the walk as a combat engineer. A truly caring insightful man who cares deeply for us to this day. I no longer deny Ptsd, but he says, and I believe, it can never be cured but with help it can be somewhat managed. Where that help comes from is not my choice, but from above is a part of it and especially from my best friend my wife. Thanks to Larry for this website and to my squadleader Ben and to the LT for listening and laughing together and caring about eachother.
Some very interesting comments here a while back on PTSD and war stories. I was going to make a few comments on PTSD, but didn’t. But since I got some kudos and comments on my marathon, maybe my comments are noteworthy. A few years ago upon urging of friends and family, I did go to the VA for evaluation and I was diagnosed with “hyper-vigilance”. So I have the same stories to repeat about what I think is just plain prudent in being aware and ready in one’s surroundings. I wake up automatically around 4:30-5:00 and my mind goes immediately to the morning back in VN when this dink starts shooting at me at the crack of dawn and I am “combat ready”. Sometimes I go back to sleep, sometimes I go to work or read the mail or go for a walk or a run. I think I was a good soldier and will always think of myself as a good soldier. In my scout leader days I had a standing challenge to anyone that could beat me at any of our activities would win my special Boy Scout Coin. I still have it, although I have to concede that my son finally pinned me after my match with someone else and he had 80 lbs. advantage. I often compete against military men and women and beat a few. The one I remember best was last summer’s Iowa Warrior Dash. I was in the same flight with 3 young active duty Marines. Their time was 1:02 for the 5K obstacle course and I came in at :50. I am proud that I beat them by 12 minutes, but it also says a lot about today’s soldiers and my “PTSD”. I like to think I do not have a problem, but I will have some things to work out when my health fails. In the meantime: GO ARMY!
Anyone remember Robert Daugherty killed on this date in 1972 and how it happened?
Carl,
I sure do, and I believe it was an RPG, I’m not positive.
I did not know Robert, but I do have these notes: “Bob was new, in C, Company. I talked to him one time, about ten minutes, before he was killed by a grenade, thrown at him. It was his second, tour, in Vietnam. RIP., Bob.â€
Some other notes I have was he was killed only 42 days after his tour started and one of 15 guys that did not survive 2 months. He was the very last Charlie Company guy killed.
Robert was 23 at the time of his death and he was from Abilene, TX.
Larry, did you get my e-mail on Hoot Gibson and Dane Hammond ? Tooch
I did get your email that corrected Dane’s name. You never said in your email if you would try and find these guys by calling the phone numbers I gave you to try.
Hey Larry,
Happy 45th Draft anniversary! That calls for a bunch of “drafts” to be consumed. Waiting for you to let me know who you want me to try to find. I have lots of time on my hands with this “cabin fever” weather we are enjoying.
I will get you some stuff later today I hope. I am really bogged down doing income tax returns. Farmers have to file on or before March 1 and farmers are a majority of my practice.
Everyone’s R & R should be over by now and should have time to post. Wednesday will be my 45th anniversary that I was drafted.
Hey. Talk about hard core!
Ben. A full marathon at 68! Wow. And especially a FIRST TIME full marathon. Excellent for a ton of reasons. I ran three marathons in 1980-81; best time was 3:48 but, obviously a lot younger than-like, exactly half my current age. Marathons are no longer for me; it’s gym and treadmills. Fantastic effort and congratulations. I hope you weren’t one of those showoffs who drop and do pushups after you cross the finish line! but if you were, that’s great too.
Happy 68th birthday Ben Buehler!
Hey Larry,
Nice shot of you sitting under the C/2/1 guidon at the table at DC which finally got posted. As I told Ben before I am glad he can do these things when I have a hard time walking 100 yards. My running days are definitely over!
CONGRATULATIONS to Ben Buehler on completing his first Full Marathon ( A1A Marathon) held yesterday in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida! He has run several half-marathons and warrior dashes, but decided that a full marathon would be an ultimate challenge. At four days shy of his 68th birthday, I say… GREAT JOB BEN!!!
Roger & Carl:
I was away from the web site for awhile and I do have some input on what you guys wrote. Instead of going back and putting a reply to your posts that may not be read, I am responding to some of your comments or questions.
First, I want to respond to Carl’s comment “It could be difficult to change any of this since this is a Charlie 2/1 website. Since I was there on 2/9, I would like to see that part of it. I may be the only one on here that was there so the others may not care about this major battle but I certainly doâ€.
My response to Carl “I am sure that all most all of the guys that visit this site are very interested in the goings on in our company. I was not there, but I am very interested in everything with our company in Viet Nam. I have been accumulating the history for Charlie Company for years. I have some of the primary source material for every event that Charlie Company had causalities. The primary source records that I have are radio logs, unit journals, and after action reports. It is very hard and it takes forever to collect these records. I try and keep every eye witness of every battle and follow up sooner or later to get all the information I can. I do know of every date that Charlie Company took casualties and some of what happened that day. I hope to have enough written factual records soon to ask someone like Gary Capshaw if he would write Charlie Company’s Viet Nam history.â€
Second I want to respond to Roger’s question “If at any time anyone sees anything as inaccurate or that can be enhanced in any way I would love it. For instance, I still haven’t understood that D Company was in the same fight as C and A. Any enlightenment on that would be great.â€
My response to Roger “ According to the records I have , there was also five killed from D 2/1, three from A 2/1, and one from Arty 82, so I am sure they were a part of this battle.†I also kept a post to the 196th site but have never been able to get this guy to answer any of my emails that said he was there or who he is “Anyone remember either SSGT Norbert Holzapfel or SSGT Donald Alvis KIA 2/9/68 just west of Da Nang 2/1 C Co. Not sure which one I was with. Was with one of them when they got hit. Sniper jumped up out of a hole in front. There were only 4 or 5 of us left out in the paddy (punge,phil,and someone else besides me. Just wondering. Think about him alot. He was going on RR to meet his wife in a week or so. thanks
bill â€
The above email I tried to post in the last paragraph was from bill<wifr5 at aol.com.
I sent Bill an email on the 11th but never received a reply. When I mentioned this was C 2/1 website, I was referring to Roger’s remarks concerning A 1/6 198th. Larry, I think it would be a great idea to put together all the info about the firefights we were in and get as much info from the guys who fought in the firefights. If there are 100 guys in a firefight, there are 100 different perspectives. The toughest part may be from the early guys down in Tay Ninh. With Gary’s talent for writing, he would be the guy to write the history, but that would be a huge task. I’m more than willing to help fill in where I can.
Larry. Thanks for the post. I do agree that Delta Co must have came to the fight and lost their 5 people plus their FO Robert Byrnes. I remember Charlie company being in contact and pinned in the paddies, and I remember assaulting ton their right flank. I just don’t remember Delta being there (not saying they weren’t, saying I don’t remember). It wasn’t until I read a post on the wall for Bondrowsky from Ronnie Payne:
ronnie payne
ronnierockpayne@yahoo.com (I tried emailing this address, dead end)
i served, with him, in nam, D, co.-2-1
149, harmon hill rd., martinsville, va., 24112, usa
I’ve never, forgotten you, “ski”
I enjoyed getting, to know you and the talks, we had. We knew each, only, a short time, but had started, to become friends. The 68, Tet offensive, shortened, our time together. It was Feb. and we were south, of Danang, Airbase, near Hoi An. A, Co., got hit and we went, to help them. We had, a bad firefight and were pinned down. you were not, far, from me, when you, got hit. You’ve been a part, of my memory and my life, since that day. You are, a hero and my friend and I miss you.
Wednesday, November 30, 2005
So he had the same story as I did: Another unit was in trouble and they came to help, and lost people in the process. Two of the three from A Company, Haile and Martin, were in my platoon.
Anyhow, I would still love to understand from D Co’s perspective how that day went, and to thank them for coming to our relief.
Your research, finding radio logs, unit journals, after action reports. How do you do that? I would love to have some of those sources to plug in the holes in my story of the events.
Roger
This is a strange discussion forum. There’ll be a flurry of posts by different people and then suddenly it just goes completely quite for days or weeks at a time.
It’s like we all get too drunk to type at the same time.
Doc Allen Hoe of the Recon platoon E 2/1 posted a photo relating to this event at the 196 Facebook group https://www.facebook.com/groups/58069447754/
Anybody who can tag the grunts?
Doc Hoe knows a lot of people. At the DC reunion of the 196 last July, he knew the General who was in charge of the Tomb of the Unknown. Some medics from Nam, including Rollie Morrison of A 4/31st, laid a wreath at the Tomb. Rollie was so moved by that , he could hardly tell me about it. The best part is that his son is active military and was there to witness it. Rollie was shaking so bad hours after it was over. It may have been the highlight of his life. It certainly would be in my top 3.
Roger: Quite an interesting and detailed account. Thanks.
I was C36 through Camp Drum and then A36 through July, 1967.
Was your call sign Fighter (2/1) Alpha Three-six? I have often wondered how long the batallion used Fighter.
Jim
Welcome back.
I was Invader Alpha 36. Maybe they changed call signs when they moved from Tay Ninh…
although that move was before my time and perhaps that is not it at all. Like so many other things.
Do you remember any names from A36? When I joined them in October 67, there were a lot of men who you and I must have overlapped knowing. One of the squad leaders was Peterson. You would probably have known Ronald Smith, aka smitty, who carried the pig and maybe Charlie Martin, the native american. But I don’t know why your memory would be any better than mine, but thought I would ask.
In C2/1, it seemed like our call sign changed when we changed CO’s. When I got there in Nov 67, we were Hemlock, then Twister, and then right before I left it was Sterno Fence, whatever the heck that is.
Some battle is all I can say!
It’s kind of funny that it takes 40 years before you know the whole story. There’s a lot there but that’s only 2 days for me. How much don’t we know about our whole year there!
Carl, Here you go. Before 2/9 when we were there, here is 2/8.
Enemy activity began anew early the morning of 8 Feb 68. At 0345 hours, enemy mortar rounds fell into the CAP Echo 4 compound at map grid BT 028704 near Lo Giang. By daylight, enemy ground forces surrounded the CAP hamlet. At 0602 hours, the fourteen men at the location under the command of SGT B. Keith Cossey received heavy small arms fire from BT 027699. Four NVA killed in the action were found to be armed with CS (tear gas) grenades. All friendly units in the area were alerted of the enemy gas attack capabilities. The defenders at CAP Echo 4 had expended most of their ammunition, but rearmed themselves with enemy weapons and ammunition.
As daylight arrived over the area, an OV-1 “bird dog” aircraft detected approximately 400 persons on the ground in the vicinity of Lo Giang. The aerial observer could not determine whether the soldiers were enemy or friendly before they disappeared under the canopy of trees in the area. Such brazen daylight moves by large enemy forces were a rarity. The information about the large number of suspected enemy soldiers was communicated to the Marine MP (Military Police) unit in Da Nang, but it was not in turn communicated to the 1st Bn 6th Inf soldiers in the vicinity of Lo Giang, or the Marine reaction force, or rest of Task Force Miracle coming in to help secure the area. This was certainly unfortunate as I believe knowledge of such a large force in their immediate vicinity would have impacted everyone’s tactics on the day of the 8th.
At first light, the local “coke kids” found the soldiers of C/1-6 near BT 005694 and began trying to sell soft drinks. One of them not only recognized the 198th Inf Bde shoulder patch, but said “198th, you come fast.” In view of the attack on the Marines at CAP Echo 4, C/1-6 was ordered to move from its NDP location and to advance to the northeast toward the Lo Giang village at BT 025705.
In addition, because of the size of the attack against CAP Echo 4, Marines from adjacent CAP units and the CAP headquarters north of the Cao Do formed a reaction force under CPT Howard L. Joselane to come to their aid. One of the Marine volunteers in the force, SGT Dennis W. Hammond, had less than three weeks to go before returning to the States, but stated that this was his “last chance” to accomplish something. The relief force was taken by truck across the Cam Le Bridge and south on QL1 to the vic BT 016698 where they started toward Echo 4. The reaction force was composed of a “pickup†group of Marines with specialties including Rifleman, Field Artillery Crewman, Freight Operations Manager, Motor Vehicle Operator, ONTOS crewman, ONTOS artillery repairman, Communications Wireman, and a Navy Medical Corpsman. The ONTOS was a self propelled tracked vehicle sporting 6 105MM recoilless rifles.
The Marine Radioman Tim Readinger moved to the CAP-2 location at Hoa Vang, on the airfield side of the Cam Lo River. He witnessed a force of some 300 NVA and the locals they forced to move with them to provide cover, crossing the Cam Lo River as part of their planned follow-up assault on the Da Nang airfield. This attack was broken up by the South Vietnamese Air Force! Flying WWII planes, and dropping 500 lb bombs which dispersed the NVA and the Civilians alike.
At 0826 hours, A/1-6 received small arms fire from BT 026705. They also observed large numbers of civilians fleeing to the northeast from Lo Giang village. [I believe that this was a mix of NVA Soldiers moving to a new attack on the Da Nang airfield, plus civilians forced to accompany them to provide cover, and that this is the group that was fording the river when bombed by the ARVN airforce] Having received the proper clearance, they began firing 81mm mortar rounds into the outskirts of the village. As C/1-6 began to crossed highway QL1 near BT 016698 at 0940 hours, automatic weapons from enemy soldiers located in the pagoda at BT 022724 passed over their heads and increased as they advanced. The enemy fire, however, may have directed at the Marine relief force who, unbeknownst to them, was much closer to the village.
As the CAP relief force under CPT Joselane that had been attempting to reinforce CAP Echo 4 approached the tree line on the west end of Lo Giang, they suddenly came under intense fire at close range. They sought shelter in a drainage ditch just outside the tree line. Shortly after the attack began, they were overwhelmed by large numbers of VC and NVA. They radioed for help and then a short time later announced that they were being overrun. Capt Joselane’ s last words over the radio were “they’re all over us….no way out. Don’t send anyone
else in here…tell my wife I love her.” Thirteen marines in the relief force were killed by the enemy. Some of the Marines were bayoneted as they lay wounded.
Three Marines, including SGT Hammond, were captured by the NVA as POWs, but one later managed to escape. SGT Hammond later died in captivity, as did Lance Corporal Don Talbot. One Marine, although badly wounded, miraculously survived due to the magnanimity of a NVA radio operator who spared his life. The Marine had befriended the NVA soldier earlier while on a CAP mission. The NVA soldier had pretended to be a Vietnamese peasant who needed food and medical attention.
.
[Note: The harrowing nature of the ordeal suffered by the Marines in the relief force and their incredible bravery has been spelled out in detail in an excellent story prepared by Mike “Tiny” Readinger that can be found on the Marine CAP web site. Those few brave Marines in the aborted relief effort did not stand a chance against a numerically superior NVA force that would practically overrun two platoons of A Co/1-6 Inf only a short time later. Their efforts, however, provided hope to the beleaguered CAP defenders and forced the NVA to shift their attention away from CAP Echo 4.] Roger’s note: And shifted their attention from the airbase at Da Nang.
Although they were only eight hundred meters away from the valiant relief force, the soldiers in Alpha Company did not realize that the Marines were even in their designated operational area. While they heard firing and observed the fighting in the distance, they had no radio contact with the Marines. They could not tell “who was who” or exactly what was going on near the hamlet. The Marines, likewise, were unaware that Army troops were on their left flank and that they had been given tactical responsibility for the area. Once the NVA troops revealed their presence and launched their assault, the small Marine relief force was overrun before the Army
soldiers could have come to their aid. This was not the last time on 8 Feb 68 when the lack of communications and coordination between Army and Marine forces would have tragic results.
In the meantime, CPT Bradley (C/1-6) sent his 2nd platoon forward toward the village. One squad was to move into the village to determine where the NVA soldiers were located. They crossed the ditch several hundred meters from where the bodies of the Marine relief force were later found and noticed a LAW pointed down the ditch as a booby trap. They blew it in place with grenades. At about 1015 hours they spotted three NVA soldiers running away into the village. They wounded and then caught one who was trying to escape down into a tunnel. He was dressed in a khaki
uniform, had been hit in the shoulder and arm, and was pleading for medical help.
Just as they were attempting to question him, “all hell broke loose” as the NVA opened fire from 50 m. or less. Several NVA snipers were cleverly concealed in the tall trees that were devoid of limbs or vegetation for the first thirty feet of trunk. The squad leader was hit immediately, and then the medic (PFC Walter R. Pratt) was mortally wounded. Four more were wounded by 1100 hours. The unit was pinned down in the rice paddy area west of Lo Giang, while their platoon in the village was under continuous attack.
Meanwhile, the enemy attack on CAP Echo 4 continued in earnest. The Marines in the small fortified position near the village of Lo Giang (1) reported that they were under heavy attack by large numbers of NVA soldiers. Although badly outnumbered, the CAP Echo 4 defenders were fortified with bunkers and wire entanglements.
Because of the intense automatic weapons fire and mortar rounds that inflicted many casualties, C/1-6 was unable to advance toward Lo Giang. In the meantime, Company B, 1-6, under the command of CPT Dan A. Prather, had been flown north from LZ Gator near Chu Lai and had arrived south of Da Nang at LZ 410 at 1050 hours. At 1132 hours they were ordered to move by truck to BT 015695 and to link up with the Marines under attack at CAP Echo 4.
Company G, 2nd Bn 3rd Marines, from LZ 410, was on the right flank of B/1-6 Inf as
they moved toward CAP Echo 4. The Marines killed 7 NVA as they advanced. At 081510 Feb however, they were released to their parent unit and moved to the east of the Vinh Diem River to search for a reported 1,000 man NVA force. [The next day Companies G and F of 2nd Bn 3rd Marines killed 107 NVA at BT 031698].
Approximately 1500 meters to the northeast, the combat action near A/1-6 was increasing. At 1132 hours, the soldiers began receiving heavy automatic weapons fire from BT 025706. A/1-6 reported receiving additional automatic weapons fire at 1136 hours. Their mortar fire into the village paid off with secondary explosions. At 1233 hours, CPT Brennan decided to “check out the village” and told his forward observer to have a fire mission “laid on the village” as they prepared to attack. In an audio tape he prepared in Feb 68,
CPT Brennan described the action in his own words:
“I put two of my rifle platoons on a skirmish line, followed by the CP group
centered on the two platoons and a platoon held in reserve trailing the CP group
by 100 meters. …The two platoons on line covered a width of approximately
200 meters. The configuration was 2nd Platoon on the left (East) side and
3rd Platoon on the right (West) side and the 1st Platoon trailing in reserve.
The weapons platoon went into action [from the cover of the NDP position in the
graveyard at BT 023710].”
“A Company was flanked on both sides by at least an NVA company on each
side and was sustaining a frontal assault by another NVA company. The
enemy assault element was on line, advancing in a crouched firing position
from the northwest wood line at the village. The flank enemy elements were
attempting to link up at our rear, thus encircling [the unit].”
In a matter of seconds A Co. and two companies of a unit positively identified as the
60th Main Force Viet Cong Battalion (60% to 70% NVA soldiers), First NVA Regiment 2nd NVA Division with the 370th Hqs Company, were in a hand to hand battle in the rice paddies immediately north of Lo Giang (1). During the initial heavy contact, A Co. killed 78 NVA soldiers and suffered 10 KHA and 22 WHA.
The second platoon leader, 2LT Bowman, was killed in the fight, but subsequently received the nation’s second highest decoration for valor–the Distinguished Service Cross. At one point, CPT Brennan received a call from the second platoon radio telephone operator (RTO) who thought 2LT Bowman was dead:
“The second platoon RTO called in a state of near panic. He said the enemy were crawling directly to his rear and each flank.”
CPT Brennan observed that “The proximity of the enemy fire was approximately
ten to twenty meters at times. The enemy was attempting to intermingle with
my troops having cut off our route of withdrawal.” He concluded that the
“only hope left for the company was to pull back to the mortar position and
to reorganize.”
At 1415 hours, on the west side of Lo Giang, the platoon from C/1-6 inside the village popped smoke on both sides of their position. Eight sorties of tactical air support arrived from the 1st Marine Air Wing. The bombs and other mixed ordnance blunted the continuing NVA attack. The men from C/1-6 in the western part of the village dragged their dead and wounded out and low crawled back across the paddies toward the highway. At some point, Marine medivac helicopters were able to land on a large dike that ran perpendicular to the road and toward the village. All six soldiers were dusted off by Marine helicopters, and the accompanying gun ships remained to provide additional fire support.
After the air strikes, the NVA resumed their assault from the northern side of Lo Giang, but the defenses of A/1-6 held. Seventy four additional NVA were killed in the open. At 1500 hours, CPT Brennan was wounded, along with his two RTOs. Both radios were destroyed and communications were lost with the battalion headquarters. PFC Victor Girling, an artillery reconnaissance sergeant, bandaged one of the RTOs and dragged him in a low crawl 300 m. back to the graveyard.
Not all the combat action had been confined to A/1-6. C/1-6 continued to be subjected to rifle fire and heavy automatic weapons fire. As CPT Bradley (C/1-6) assembled his platoon leaders to plan their next move, the unit came under a severe mortar barrage and all the officers were wounded. At 1530 hours were subjected to an intense mortar attack at BT 018698. By late afternoon they had suffered 2 KIA and 28 WHA (including all officers) as they tried to move toward Lo Giang. Abandoning their rucksacks and packs, the soldiers moved out of the area and to the west of the highway away from the precise targeting of the enemy mortars.
Company B, 1st Bn 6th Inf also ran into significant enemy resistance on the southwest side of Lo Giang. At 1450 hours as they tried to move through the village and toward the CAP Echo 4 location, they came under small arms fire at BT 022694. At 1532 hours they were subjected to a heavy enemy mortar barrage. In regard to the enemy mortar fire, CPT Prather’s said:
“[t]he simple fact that we were operating in a wet rice paddy saved a lot of lives.
Rounds buried themselves before detonating….[The mortar rounds] hit right
behind us within 5 to 10 feet, but they went down in the mud so far that all it
did was spray our entire backs with mud and absolutely no shrapnel.”
By 1615 hours they finally located the enemy mortar position, and pounded it with their own mortars. The soldiers hugged the dikes very closely and were able to crawl into good fighting positions. The enemy soldiers got up out of their fighting positions and formed on line to assault the Americans. As CPT Prather related:
“That became the downfall of the main [enemy] force in doing that, in that we
were hidden pretty well behind the dikes. We just cut them apart….I thought it
strange looking up and seeing these people coming and thinking, my God, they’re
on line for an assault.”
Eventually the Americans counter-attacked and overran the enemy mortar position at BT 023697. They killed 30 NVA at a loss of only 2 soldiers WHA.
Fortunately, the Marines at CAP Echo 4 did not have to wait on the arrival of B/1-6 Inf. According to the official Marine historical accounts, they had managed “to hold out against overwhelming odds.” At 1550 hours they were extracted by air.
At 1615 hours, PFC Girling reestablished radio contact for A/1-6, and gave the battalion headquarters the first word of the company’s situation. While he coordinated artillery and gunship strikes, the soldiers had consolidated their position in the cover of the cemetery at BT 022713. Up to that point, fourteen were known to have been killed, and another 35 wounded. CPT Brennan was evacuated by helicopter, and 2LT William B. Wendover assumed command of the unit.
Because of the losses and reduced strength of A/1-6, Co E, 1st Bn 6th Inf (E/1-6) was
ordered to move from LZ 410 to help consolidate their defenses with A/1-6 Inf at
BT 022712. Co C/1-6 also moved into their position at BT 014697. The confirmed enemy body count at that time was as follows: A – 207; B – 37; C-14; G (Marines)- 8. Ninety percent of the enemy had full web gear, including combat packs. Several had been armed with CS or WP grenades that exploded in a cloud when they were struck by buckshot or bullets. Over 100 enemy weapons were counted by A Co alone.
Later in the evening an additional tragedy unfolded. At 1947 hrs, soldiers from ER/1-6 were shot up by a Marine helicopter flight consisting of one flareship and two gunships. The helicopters were conducting an aerial patrol over the Cau Do River to ensure the NVA were not able to cross the river at night. They apparently did not realize that Army troops were in the area and had been given permission to fire by Marine units on the north side of the river. A Marine liaison officer left the Army perimeter in disgrace when none of his recognition signals or radio calls on the announced air-ground frequency could stop the so-called “friendly fire.” Communications were finally established on the UHF air – guard frequency. Two soldiers from E Co. 1-6 Inf were wounded in the incident.
It should be noted that until 081430 Feb 68, the 1st Bn 6th Inf commander did not have a command and control (C&C) helicopter at his disposal. When it finally arrived it was used for two hours for medivac and resupply. A/1-6 had 28 WIA and C/1-6 had 17 WIA. The C&C helicopter pilots were WO1 Edward A. Fitzsimmons and 1LT David R. Ewing of the “Minutemen”, 176th Assault Helicopter Company. They flew 21 sorties into the battlefield, evacuated 31 wounded, and resupplied all companies. To quote the official After Action Report:
“[w]ithout the courage and skill of Mr. Fitzsimmons and LT Ewing it is doubtful if all the wounded would have been evacuated prior to darkness on the night of 8 Feb 1968.”
On February 8, my Battalion (2/1 196LIB) was assigned to Task Force Miracle with the objective of assisting in securing Da Nang and the surrounding area. Our Battalion was airlifted LZ 410 and established NDP’s near there overnight.
On the morning of the February 9, as the 1-6 continued their second day of fighting, the 2/1st battalion was deployed to cutoff the Southern escape route of the NVA with Company B taking the perimeter and Companies A, C, and D to perform sweeps. Company A to the North and West, Company C to the North and East, and Company D (I don’t know, the South?). These Company assignments are current day reconstructions and are subject to correction.
Company A swept through the area, hamlets and rice paddies. We patrolled North to the Cau Do River, to the west of the Ql1 bridge. We encountered nothing.
In the late morning we got radio reports that C Company had made contact. Subsequent reports were that their situation was deteriorating, in that elements of the company command center were wounded, that the Artillery Forward Observer, Lt Robert Byrnes had been killed so they could not direct artillery effectively, and were pinned down and generally in a bad position. Orders came for us to make our way back to a road, where Major Willet (HHC) met us with a small fleet of trucks. We loaded onto the trucks and went some kilometers south along the road.
We got off the trucks, and could hear the firefight relatively close by. We maneuvered in the direction of the firefight. We crossed a small dry area with bushy vegetation, and then came up to a field of rice paddies about 75 meters across with a tree line on the far side. There was a path through the paddies from the dry ground where we were to the far tree line. At this point, the fighting was off to our left, with the enemy fire coming from part of the same tree line. To better understand the tree line, think of the ground as an island in the paddies, curving around away from us. To better understand the rice paddies, they were dry or muddy, not filled with water as they sometimes were.
I had the platoon spread to an assault line, side by side, a couple of meters between each of the 25 (or so) men, while we were still on the dry area. Once formed, we advanced through treeline to the field of rice paddies. About 1/3 of the way across (maybe 25 meters of a 75 meter field), we received intensive small arms fire. We hit the ground in the field and returned fire. My RTO Max Koppelman was right next to me (as a good RTO is supposed to be) cried out “I’m hit, I can’t see.†I checked him and saw his eyes closed. “Open your eyes†I said, and he did and that helped his seeing. We later decided that a bullet had struck him in the helmet, but he was uninjured. I later realized that the bottle of bug juice, had been shot off my helmet as well. I think they target the RTO and the person next to the RTO (me).
To my left, across a trail through the field, I could see Charlie Martin and heard him say “They are up in the trees†and he directed his fire at the enemy there. Charlie was a Native American, of the Akwesane Mohawk nation, and was my alternate point man while on patrol. The platoon Sargent, Donald Haile, was close to him.
Company A’s forward observer called in a fire mission: artillery fire on the enemy position in the tree line on the far side of the field. As the forward element of my company, I took on adjusting that artillery fire. We could hear our artillery rounds whistle as they came in, since we were between the targets and the fire support base where the artillery was deployed. The first rounds were long, so I had them drop 25 meters (this was no time to use the normal rule of adjusting fire: Make bold corrections), and they were still long. Another drop 25; those rounds landed right in the tree line. I gave the next fire command: “Fire for effect†– and the rounds were landing right in the tree line that the NVA was shooting at us from. Yeah.
We had been in the same position for a several hours and dusk was beginning to fall (6 PM Local time). The command to pull back came in on the radio, and I ordered my men to fall back. I was about half way back when that I heard the unmistakable hollow “thunk†sound of a mortar being fired. This was not good news since we didn’t carry mortars. Very quickly I heard that whistling sound, pitch rising indicating it was coming toward our position. Incoming! Hit the deck! Back to lying face down in the paddy, and the mortar hit about 5 yards away. It dug into the paddy, and then exploded. It is a white phosphorous (WP) round.
So that we all understand white phosphorous, here is a brief overview thanks again to Wikipedia:
common names include WP, and the slang term “Willie Pete,” which is dated from its use in Vietnam. As an incendiary weapon, white phosphorus burns fiercely and can set cloth, fuel, ammunition and other combustibles on fire, and cause serious burns or death.
The explosion blew a stream of WP up into the air, forming a shape like an umbrella, with me under the arc between where the WP went up and where it fell down. A very small bit of WP landed on my forearm. Instinctively, and in accordance with training, I smeared mud on the spot (one of the few times that a wet paddy was a good thing) and this stopped the burning. As a result of this, I have what I call my “lucky scar†which has really been a touch point for me. I see it whenever I wear a short sleeve shirt, and it has insured that I remember that day.
There was only one mortar round, and after “the smoke had clearedâ€, we finished regrouping back in the tree line. Taking count, we found that Sp4 Charlie Martin and SSGT Donald Haile had not returned. We found them in the field, both KIA. SSGT Haile had his knife drawn, and there was a decapitated snake next to him. I believe that SSGT Haile encountered the snake during the firefight, he was fighting it, and in so doing raised himself to where he was a good target for the NVA. I also believe that Charlie Martin was firing from a kneeling position, also making himself a good target.
As night fell, we consolidated positions with C Company (and subsequent reports indicate that D Company was there as well, but I don’t remember that). A Marine Helicopter came to take our wounded, and I remember being amazed at how many people could get into one of them (they were much bigger than the Army’s Hueys I was used to). One evacuee was Sgt Buck Lawhorn, the squad leader from (as he liked to call it) the third herd (of the third platoon). He had been shot cleanly through the leg, perhaps by a tracer, since there was little blood. He was walking wounded.
There were several conversations that night. From my first(?) squad leader Peterson: We saw that mortar land and said Goodbye 36. I’m glad he was wrong about that. Peterson also relayed word from one C Company solder that: “We had been pinned down for hours, and that charge that you guys did out of the treeline was a beautiful thing, and I started to believe that I might survive to the end of the day.â€
From someone in C Company, I learned that 1LT Robert Lewis had been killed; wounded on January 5 during a 2 day engagement where that company had sustained 18 Killed and many wounded. He was working to unload a helicopter bring in ammunition and supplies when wounded. He died 5 days later of pneumonia. Perhaps that incident just a month ago impacted the ability of C Company in the fight on 2/9. Perhaps not. [That action is well documented in James Humphries Through the Valley] Oh for those days on Hill 54 where one of the concerns was the capacity of the ice machine at the officers club.
The third casualty from A Co was John Palmieri. I think he was in another platoon, and I don’t specifically remember him. B Co lost 1, C Co lost 5, and D Co lost 4 that day. I don’t know the total wounded. Lt Colonel Hammond came to the consolidated position the next morning. We were reviewing the action, and there was discussion of who had been wounded. Someone asked about those who had been burned, and he said they should not be included. That’s how I didn’t get a purple heart. Overall, the battalion had 14 Killed and 32 wounded on this day of fighting
The after action reports indicate that there were 46 NVA killed and 1 captured (undoubtedly wounded). The rest of the battalion we had been facing had retreated to their safer ground at Go Noi island, or to Happy Valley and Charlie Ridge to the West. Go Noi island is the upland portion of the Song Thu Bon river delta, just north of hill 958 which separates Da Nang from the Que Son valley. Subsequent Marine action reports detail significant engagements in this area over the next month.
From the Marines After Action report on the fighting around Da Nang during Tet (highlighting mine) and referring to February 8:
By that evening, Army Task Force Miracle, under Army Colonel Louis Gelling, the commander of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, had been established in the Da Nang area of operations. Gelling, the task force headquarters, and the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, under the command of U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Lyman H. Hammond, Jr., had arrived from Chu Lai that afternoon.
Establishing his command post near Duong Son, Colonel Gelling assumed operational control of the 1st of the 6th near Lo Giang (5) and placed the 2d of the 1st in blocking positions below Lo Giang (l). During the following day, while the 1st of the 6th mopped up in its area, the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry attacked north. The latter battalion ran into a North Vietnamese battalion and engaged it in a nine-hour battle. Pulling back its assault elements, the Army unit saturated the area with artillery. They later found 46 enemy bodies and took a wounded man prisoner.
Intelligence indicated that the enemy unit in the southern hamlet was from the 3d Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment, and the units in Lo Giang (5) were from the 1st VC Regiment. In the meantime, that day, on the eastern flank of the Army units, on the east bank of the Vinh Dinh River, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines encountered two companies from the 1st VC Regiment and killed about 90 of the enemy. The enemy offensive in the Da Nang sector had spent itself. During the next few days, Task Force Miracle conducted sweeps in its sector and encountered relatively little resistance. Both the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines to the east of the Army task force, and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines to the south, also reported relatively little enemy activity in their sectors. Only the 7th Marines to the west experienced an increase in incidents as North Vietnamese regulars and the VC main force troops moved through the western TAOR to return to their mountain strongholds in Base Area 114 (west of Hue) and through Charlie Ridge into “Happy Valley.
To the south, in the Korean sector, the ROK Marines with the assistance of the ARVN again drove Communist forces out of the Hoi An environs. According to an enemy NCO from the 31st NVA Regiment captured in the fighting, the mission of his unit was to “attack Hoi An, five times if necessary, and set up a liberation government.” Hoi An still remained in friendly hands.
In the Que Son Valley on 9 February, the Americal Division engaged elements of the 21st NVA Regiment, the only regiment of the 2d NVA Division that had not been in the Da Nang sector. The 21st was also in retreat. According to Marine intelligence reports, on 9 February, the 2d NVA Division moved its headquarters back to the Go Noi from its more forward positions. The following day, the same sources indicated that both the lst VC and the 3d NVA Regiments had also withdrawn to the Go Noi.
The TET battles continued throughout I Corps, Hue, February 29, Quang Tri February 9, Khe Sahn July 1968. Even after the city battles, there were continuing operations to pursue the enemy throughout the region.
Overall, Task Force Miracle suffered 49 killed and 100 wounded over the 2 day period of February 8 and 9. The NVA killed was approximately 400 and the NVA wounded is unknown but significant.
The NVA never gave up on their efforts to attack Da Nang from the south. On 23 Aug 1968, NVA forces attacked at Da Nang and Marble Mountain Air Field — where they hoped to seize the airfield for a day and to destroy as many aircraft as possible. A separate NVA force launched a coordinated ground, mortar and CS attack on the Cam Le Bridge at BT 016 715 and overran the south end of the bridge – only 2,000 m from the runways at Da Nang. They were able to use a .50 cal. machine gun captured in the attack with devastating results against the Americans. Once again, when soldiers (this time the 1st Bn 27th Marines) approached their defensive positions, the NVA held their fire until the last minute. The NVA forces finally were driven from their defensive positions at the Cam Le Bridge by air strikes, artillery, and tanks supporting the Marines.
The Tet offensive changed everything. As was usually true, the PAVN chose the time and place to engage, and they did it big. Militarily, they lost most of the battles, none without inflicting a good deal of pain on US forces, SVN forces, and the population in general. They were disappointed that the population didn’t rise up to welcome their “liberatorsâ€, a lesson we seemed to have forgotten by the time we invaded Iraq. They were not disappointed by the reactions they got in the US, and must have been ecstatic about Walter Cronkite’s dispatch from Da Nang calling the war a quagmire and the subsequent changes in popular opinion in the United States.
This is Chapter 4 of my memoir “The rest is just fate”
Corrections or enhancements most welcome.
Roger,
Just a couple of quick notes here. The paddy that I was pinned down in was full of water. The jets had dropped a couple of bombs into the paddy, which was very wide, and it made some 10-15 foot ponds. When we got out of the paddy, we were given orders to get on line and assault. We had at least, one KIA in that assault. Joe Conklin was killed by a point blank shot, about a foot or less right beside me. I never heard the info about our officers being killed or wounded. Our f/o at the time, I believe, was Tony Kerns. Capt Thomasson, our CO, was on R &R at the time. 1st Lt. Prince was the acting CO. Did you guys come in off QL1? I remember laying in the paddy and being able to see traffic and personnel to my right and also behind the road I could see commercial aircraft leaving DaNang. In reading other accounts of this action, there was one other interesting incident, Gen. Westmoreland was not happy with Lt. Gen Cushman because he didn’t want to use army units. When Maj Gens. Robertson and Koster left the room, Westmoreland expressed his anger to Cushman. Also, I believe A 1/6 received a Distinguished Unit Citation for their action in this firefight.
Thanks Carl for that update.
We did come in from QL1 . Major Willet (it?) had rounded up some trucks and brought us in from our more northern sweep area (northern, but still South of the river) to where you were engaged. We did come in on your right.
A 1/6 deserved the citation for sure.
Roger
Events leading up to 2/9/1968, I was A36 at the time.
On January 27, 1968, the Communists announced their seven day cease fire for Tet 1968. On January 30, they launched the largest offensive of the war. Throughout the country, both North and South of us, the TET offensive was intense.
In I corps, there were attacks along the DMZ, in Quang Tri, Hue, and Da Nang
Attacks began in the Da Nang area at 0230; sappers attacked the III MAF (Marine Amphibious Force) compound in Da Nang, nearing the airbase, a vital element of the US military supply chain. About one hour later, enemy forces attacked the I Corps headquarters complex in Hoa Vang.
We now know that after the initial attack in Da Nang, the NVA forces had gone to ground about 3 Kilometers south of the airfield, south of the Cau Do River, in a village called Lo Giang. They planned to renew their attack on February 7, but deferred to February 8 for logistical reasons. That one day delay would make a huge difference in the outcome.
2/7/68
In response to the increasing pressure at the DMZ (Khe Sahn, Camp Carrol, Dong Ha, etc), units of the Marine Divisions and the Army’s First Cav in I Corp were re-aligned to the northern portions of I Corps. After the TET offensive and the attacks on Da Nang, the most vital seaport and airfield in I corps, on February 7, General Westmoreland came for a briefing on the tactical situation. After receiving the briefing, Westmoreland “in exasperation†ordered the 1st Marine Division Commander Major General Donn Robertson and the Americal Division Commander Major General Samuel Koster to leave the room “to return only when they had worked out a viable plan for closely coordinated offensive action against the enemy threatening the airfield.†Upon their return and a briefing, Westmoreland then turned to Major General Koster and said: “Sam, you let Robby have two, three, or even four battalions if he needs them.â€
As a consequence on February 7, the Americal’s 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry of the 198th LIB was tasked to send their two company “ready reaction force†(A and C as it was) plus some Headquarters elements. Receiving orders to move at 1515, they arrived at LZ 410 (Duong Son) about 8 KM South of Da Nang Airbase at 1735 hours with 131 men from A Company, with B Company (128 men) arriving an hour later. My 2/1st Battalion moved in it’s entirety into the area on February 8).
From 1965 when they arrived in the area around Da Nang, III MAF, the US Marine command in I Corps, emphasized the small unit war in the villages. Consequently they developed the Combined Action Program (CAP) that assigned a squad of US Marines to a village Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon. One of these units, CAP Echo 4, was located in the village of Lo Giang (1) [There were four villages named Lo Giang, so they are further defined as (1-4)] several kilometers south of Da Nang airbase. The objective of these and similar units was to create a bond with the local village population that would sever their relationship with the guerrillas and VC infrastructure. While the Marines emphasized these small unit relations, the MACV forces were directed at defeating the enemy’s main forces. The battle for Lo Giang conducted by the US Army soldiers from the 1st Battalion 6th Infantry and the attempted relief and eventual extraction of the Marines at CAP Echo 4 demonstrated the relationship between these two very different approaches to the war.
As an aside, the III MAF, Marine Amphibious Force, was originally to be called the III MEF, Marine Expeditionary Force. However, the similarity to the French Expeditionary Force, which had been so ignominiously defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, carried such strong negative association that the name was changed.
The 1st Bn 6th Inf were greeted by the commander of the marine unit at that location who was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division. The move had happened so rapidly that â€their presence left [the commander and staff of LZ 410] at a loss.” Only sketchy information about enemy activity was available. The 1st Bn 6th Inf commander, LTC William J. Baxley Jr. evaluated the situation and ordered his two available infantry companies to move into locations just south of the Cau Do River near the Highway 1 bridge. The operations order specified that “On contact, every effort must be made to hold and destroy the enemy.” Leaving LZ 410 at 2200, they moved through the unfamiliar territory by the light of the waxing moon (it would not be full until the 15th). Along the way to their ambush positions, they had the misfortune to have their night movement illuminated by artillery fired parachute flares called in by friendly forces. They were also swept by a searchlight from the vicinity of the Cam Le Bridge over the Cau Do River. Their presence in the area was no longer a surprise to anyone. A company established the NDP some 400 meters to the east of the bridge at 0155 hours on the 8th, and C company further west by 0215. The plan was for both companies to move from their NDPs to the small bridge and then to conduct search and destroy missions on the island formed by the Cau Do, a tributary of the river, and the Vien Dien River with center of mass for the operations at map location BT 035725.
2/8 went on to be the opening action that we remember as what happened on 2/9. I have only found this out in the last year or so.
Depending on the feedback, I’ll post the rest, or not.
If at any time anyone sees anything as inaccurate or that can be enhanced in any way I would love it. For instance, I still havn’t understood that D Company was in the same fight as C and A. Any enlightenment on that would be great.
Rest in Peace our Brothers gone
Roger,
It could be difficult to change any of this since this is a Charlie 2/1 website. Since I was there on 2/9, I would like to see that part of it. I may be the only one on here that was there so the others may not care about this major battle but I certainly do.
Jim
Alice was toting the pig that day and dropped that dink about 10 to 15 feet in front of me. That sure was an intense afternoon..
I have a couple of stories about CIB and 196 decal. Back in the 80’s I went to a reunion in St. Louis. Stopped for a bite to eat on my drive. Had a ball cap with a CIB on it. When I got out side an older fellow in a not very nice tone asked if I knew what it was! I took him to be a WW II vet. All I said was yes. He then said where did you get it & I said the old fashion way in Vietnam. He lighten up & I told him about the reunion I was going to.
The second is about 12 years ago I pulled into the parking lot of a church I was visiting in St. Petersburg, FL. I always have a 196th decal on my vehicle. A stranger walked up and asked if I had been in the 196th. The answer was yes & he told me he had been on a Long Range Recon team in the 196th. I do not remember the unit. He had been wounded in the leg. Went home to Tennessee became an alcoholic & lived in a barn with a dirt floor, a cot, & a lateran. After 20 plus years moved to Florida, met the Pastor I was going to see, sobered up, & became the custodian of the church. The only person in 45 years to recognize the patch. People ask what it stands for & I tell them.
Last one. I was at a grocery store with several guys I work with at a food pantry. We were picking up items & I was loading some in a truck when a stranger walked over & offered to help. He knew what my CIB decal on the back of my truck & anyone who had one of those had to be a good guy & wanted to help.
Only 3 cases in 45 years.
May they all rest in peace. Carl we are thankful you were not hit. God bless them and you.
Remembering on this date in 1968 Don Alvis, Joe Conklin, Gerald Williams, Alfred Bleigh, and Norbert Holzapfel at Lo Giang just south of DaNang. I was laying next to Williams when he was killed and standing next to Joe Conklin when he was killed. That was the worst sight I think I saw the whole time there. Holzapfel was a mess sgt E-6 and came to the field just for a short time to get a CIB and get promoted to E-7. 2/1 lost 14 men on that day. Sixteenn of us in 1st platoon were caught in a large rice paddie when they opened up and I was the only one not hit. I believe the hand of the Lord protected me. No other explanation!!!
Sorry to hear about Shorty and Marty. Marty was the E5 who got messed up by a booby trap around Nov. 69, right? I think the same one that killed Lt. Smith (who had just made Captain and just had a baby he never saw). Shorty was the one I remember on Jan. 11th, and I think he got the dink who killed Arky. I remember him, about 50 feet away from me, yelling “Gimme a frag†about 4 times and hearing the frags go off. He was throwing them in the bunker where the dink was. I believe Wayne-aka Alice got one with his M-16, probably the one that killed Jake. The one that wounded Shepherd, Vanderbusche and me with chicom grenades got away but I think you guys went back and got him next day or later that day.
Regarding CIB stickers and such. I have a CIB and a 196th logo on my car window. My wife uses that car for work. One day, a guy started asking her some questions about the car. It turns out he was in 196th on LZ -professional (1/46th i think). On his next visit in her store, we talked on the phone. He remembered the time we went to there LZ and there AO and they went into Laos or Cambodia or whatever it was. We figure we probably passed each onther at the firebase one of those days.
Remember that firebase? It was like in a hole with arty in the center and we had to wak like single file to get from place to place. Also, sleeping in the boonies there we slept on hills and woke up 10 feet further down than when we went to sleep! No contact while we were there and I was carrying an M-79 which I never fired. I don’t think the 90 was any use in that terrain.
anyhow. Everytime I get a car, I put a CIB sticker or two on it. I know there are not many people who know what it means but it means a lot to those who do.
GOT WORD FROM A FORMER V.A. DOC—A S.F. BUDDY DIED RECENTLY–HE WAS A DECENT GRUNT–GOT TO A-105 A FEW TIMES, AND OTHER AREAS I PRESUME.
R.I.P. EDDIE
Rest in peace Danny Roberts
Mark, I saw the choppers on the tube, sort of, it was pretty dark. Everytime I hear a Huey or any chopper for that matter, I’ve got to look up. I live close to our hospital’s flight for life chopper pad so sometimes I get a pretty good workout.
Rooting for the Broncos today also made the hair on my neck stand up.